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Figure 1: Daniel Manders Beere, ‘Scene near Whangamarino bridge’, 1866.
Source: Daniel Manders Beere, Negatives of New Zealand and Australia, 1/2-096128-
G, Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL), Wellington.
RATHER THAN merely being seen as depictions of place, images can be 
interpreted as actual sites of colonization, both in their production and as artefacts. 
The 1866 photograph ‘Scene near Whangamarino bridge’, for instance, taken by 
surveyor and photographer Daniel Manders Beere (see figure 1), features a range of 
powerful colonizing forces and accessories: the ‘male’ gaze, the gun and agricultural 
implements, and the photographic representation itself.1 This apparently peaceful 
image, I shall argue, is an example of the ways in which visual representations 
of landscape contributed to the discursive invasion of the Waikato by Europeans 
in the nineteenth century.2 The man pictured, the photographer’s brother, is seen 
to survey the landscape with his southward gaze. The fence, right, and the title 
suggest the location was not completely removed from European ‘civilization’. 
In fact, nearby were a lodge and a flaxmill — these were also photographed by 
Beere. Yet, in this image, the photographer has chosen to emphasize the wilder, 
untamed aspect of this landscape. Invading the edge of the image is a single figure, 
gun sloped across his shoulder in military manner, in his right hand what appears 
to be a short canoe paddle held like a walking stick. Leaning against the fence are 
two longer rowing oars, and close at hand is a wheelbarrow with a spade or similar 
implement. A large tin lies apparently casually discarded in the foreground. The 
Waikato River divides the image, and its seemingly calm waters reflect a scrub-
covered island and far bank which, in turn, are bounded by the low hill country to 
the west in the background.
Invading the Waikato:
A POSTCOLONIAL RE-VIEW
Simon Dench34
 Images such as ‘Scene near Whangamarino bridge’ were important weapons 
in the British campaign for the control of the meaning of the Waikato.3 The British 
military invasion in 1863–64 was a brief, though important, part of the longer-
lasting and further-reaching discursive invasion — the colonization of the Waikato 
did not begin and end with the military action. Europeans claimed the right to 
define the Waikato well before the first shots of the military campaign were fired 
in 1863. Gradually, facilitated by the military victory but not completed by it, 
Europeans were able to control the discursive meaning accorded to the area. Not 
only was the land brought under European political and economic control, but 
the dominant cultural conceptions of land, and the ways in which it was valued, 
owned and used, became European too. The intrusion of European people into 
Waikato spaces was motivated by ideological, as well as practical, considerations. 
The Waikato was re-constructed and, in some ways, re-placed in the process.
 ‘Colonization’, according to Peter Gibbons, ‘is not just an early morning fog 
that dissipates mid-morning as the bright sun of national identity comes out’.4 
When he wrote that evocative phrase, Gibbons was perhaps sitting in his office at 
the University of Waikato on a wintry morning. The Waikato region is frequently 
shrouded in fog in winter months, and often its history is similarly obscured. In 
this article, I aim to shed some light on the discursive practices associated with 
the colonization of the Waikato over the course of the nineteenth century, as well 
as the relationship between this process and the construction and application of 
identities. It is worth noting that published general histories of New Zealand, 
if they mention the Waikato at all, tend to imply that colonization was quickly 
achieved thanks to the ‘decisive’ military victory of the British Army in 1863–64 
and the subsequent raupatu (confiscation) which enabled heroic pioneers to make 
prosperous dairy farms from the bush and swamp. This is too often subsumed 
into a story of national development which underplays the diversity of specific 
local experiences and events. However, by using a postcolonial perspective and 
drawing on a spatial history approach, I intend to peel away some of the layers of 
this dominant narrative of linear progress to offer an alternative interpretation of 
the history of the Waikato.
 This re-view of the invasion(s) of the Waikato relies on a re-reading of evidence 
using methods that remain controversial and that, for some historians, fall far short 
of offering ‘proof’ in a conventional sense. While scholars across many disciplines 
are awake to the possibilities of photographs and maps as rich repositories of 
attitudes and ideologies that can underpin their pictorial or aesthetic content, 
there are important limits to the weight that can be placed on the interpretation 
of individual images. Complicating this still further is the fact that the surviving 
images form a fragmentary record and the circumstances of their retention within 
collections or archives generate questions as to their representativeness. All such 
archives are constructed according to the predilections of collectors, often remote 
in time and place from the creation of the images, a ‘corpus of selective forgettings 
and collections’.5 According to Joan Schwartz and Terry Cook, archives are not 
‘passive storehouses of old stuff’ and the decisions about what is retained, and what 
is ignored or rejected, represent ‘enormous power over memory and identity’.6 As 
Tony Ballantyne has reminded us too, ‘archives of empire’ have themselves come 
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to be seen as important sites in the production of colonial knowledge and the 
assertion of colonial control.7
 Focusing on the images themselves, as a collection and individually, I argue 
that they described the Waikato within a European frame of reference and they 
acted to justify colonization as well as to record progress towards this goal. Both 
cartography and photography were seen as scientific practices, and were therefore 
considered objective and reliable.8 But, far from being benign and impartial 
descriptions of the ‘truth’, these images operate as value-laden constructions and 
powerful transmitters of ideology. Rather than presenting actual places and events, 
they represent constructions based on European priorities, values and perceptions. 
For this reason, rather than merely being seen as depictions of place, these images 
can be interpreted as actual sites of colonization, both in their production and 
as artefacts.
 In adopting a spatial history approach, my goal here is to challenge the 
dominance of chronology as the organizing structure of traditional accounts of 
the colonization of the Waikato. This approach does not completely reject the 
importance of change over time but, rather, it seeks to downplay the potentially 
teleological or deterministic nature of what might be called the orthodox version. 
The narrative of invasion in the Waikato typically begins with General Cameron’s 
crossing of the Mangatāwhiri Stream on 13 July 1863 and ends with the collapse 
of the heroic resistance of ‘Rewi’s Last Stand’ at Ōrakau in early April 1864.9 
In fact, the discursive invasion of the Waikato began well before any military 
operations and continued long after the guns fell silent. Furthermore, the end of 
the Waikato War and subsequent raupatu did not immediately change the Waikato 
from a Māori space into a Pākehā one, even though it did accelerate and facilitate 
this process.
 But first, what is spatial history and what does it have to offer historians? 
Spatial history is essentially the history of intentions. In focusing on the spatial 
context of decisions and actions of people in the past, a spatial history methodology 
emphasizes language as the prime mediator of historical experience. It therefore 
seeks to provide an alternative lens through which to re-view historical action. 
This re-vision challenges, in particular, traditional narratives of the colonialist 
enterprise. By picking apart the cause and effect dynamic, it seeks to avoid the 
conclusion that the consequences of historical decisions and intentions were 
necessarily inevitable or even foreseen. Spatial history was a term first coined 
by Australian scholar Paul Carter in 1987. Carter criticized traditional historical 
practices for focusing on the outcomes of historical action at the expense of a 
focus on intentions. This imperial history, according to Carter, reduced space to a 
stage on which historical evidence was then selected and historical action shaped 
by the historian into a progressive narrative, in order to emphasize the emergence 
of order from chaos. ‘The governor erects a tent here rather than there,’ Carter 
pointed out, ‘the soldier blazes a trail in that direction rather than this: but, rather 
than focus on the intentional world of historical individuals, the world of active, 
spatial choices, empirical history of this kind has as its focus facts which, in a 
sense, come after the event. The primary object is not to understand or to interpret: 
it is to legitimate.’10
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 Carter’s criticisms of historians are much less valid now than when they were 
first articulated in the late 1980s, and even then his views were far from universally 
accepted. Perhaps one of the most extreme reactions to Carter’s spatial history 
approach came from fellow Australian Keith Windschuttle, who accused Carter 
(and other ‘literary critics’ and ‘social theorists’) of ‘killing’ history.11 Windschuttle 
spoke for many when he lamented that an acceptance of the postmodern position 
which called into question such staples of history as ‘objectivity’, ‘facts’, and 
even ‘truth’, left no place at all for traditional history. Thankfully, however, the 
rumours of history’s death have been greatly exaggerated and many historians 
have welcomed the ‘greater sophistication in interpreting texts and a heightened 
awareness of the cultural significance of historical writing’ that is encouraged by 
engagement with social theory.12 Indeed, it is now common practice for historians 
to consciously acknowledge their particular subjectivities, or ‘angles of vision’, 
and to analyse new kinds of evidence or re-examine existing sources, through 
a theoretically inflected lens.13 As Jennifer Tucker has written, ‘the status of 
photographs as keystones of historical explanation, and the paths through which 
photographs acquire historical meaning and value, have become topics of urgent 
intellectual and cultural interest around the world’.14 Far from denying the 
centrality of evidence to the craft of the historian, these revisionist approaches 
add to the range of what can be considered trustworthy and reliable historical 
sources. At the same time, they alert us to the possibilities and pitfalls of all 
historical sources.
 Nonetheless, a potential hazard faced by historians of empire is that, in an 
attempt to explain the processes of colonization, we may in fact serve (inadvertently) 
to reinforce and legitimate those same processes. Spatial history, as a potential 
means of avoiding such pitfalls, is therefore self-consciously postcolonial. An 
inherent and serious weakness of this approach is that, in spite of the fact that it 
recognizes that the indigenous voice is absent from the colonialist discourse, or 
perhaps at best represented as a kind of ghostly ‘other’, it cannot speak for the 
colonized or even begin to describe their experiences of colonization. Emerging, 
as it does, from the same Western intellectual and epistemological tradition as the 
colonists, there is a danger that it is undermined by the same factors that it seeks 
to expose and critique. The term ‘postcolonial’ is also perhaps unhelpful as it is in 
some ways misleading. Although it appears to refer to a time after colonization has 
finished, it actually represents and values a perspective that highlights the ongoing 
vestiges, effects and practices of colonization.
 While a spatial history postcolonial method could be applied to a range of 
colonial contexts, it is precisely because Waikato was a complex frontier that 
it lends itself strongly to such an approach. As James Belich has written, ‘New 
Zealand race relations in the nineteenth century can be understood as the growth, 
contraction, and interaction of two zones … geographical areas predominantly 
controlled by one people or the other’.15 Frontiers were the borders between the 
zones and became the fault lines of colonization. According to European modes of 
thinking, frontiers were not merely places but temporary stages in the ‘civilization’ 
of ‘savage’ lands. The dynamics of colonization dictated that the frontier should be 
continually pushed out, but the emergence of the Kīngitanga threatened to bring to 
an end the process by which the Māori zone was being slowly but surely eroded. 
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The possibility emerged that the Waikato frontier would become permanent and 
that Māori could (and would) control the Waikato indefinitely. This, for Europeans, 
was intolerable and therefore required the ratcheting up of invasion.
 One of the ways in which the frontier could be tamed was by imposing names. 
According to Carter, ‘by the act of place-naming, space is transformed symbolically 
into a place, that is, a space with history’.16 Through the act of naming, colonists 
claimed for themselves the right to describe and define a place in and on their 
own terms. The importance of these symbolic acts has also been explored in the 
New Zealand context by Giselle Byrnes.17 Both Carter and Byrnes focus on the 
incursions into the interior by early explorers, travellers and surveyors where 
they ‘discovered’ new lands, placing them within a European frame of reference 
for the first time. Deliberately and consciously ignoring the indigenous presence 
was more difficult in densely populated regions such as the Waikato, and there 
were therefore serious limits to the colonists’ capacity to control the process in 
this region. As Byrnes wrote, ‘the British came to possess New Zealand not only 
by proclamation, purchase, conflict and confiscation, but also by controlling its 
interpretation’.18 In addition, the campaign for control over the interpretation of 
the Waikato was drawn out, dynamic and contested. In ‘naming and claiming’ the 
region, colonists did not have a remotely blank canvas or a clear field.19 In spite 
of their best intentions, Waikato did not become a European space at the stroke 
of a pen, and their claims required remaking and reinforcing in response to Māori 
resistance and initiatives.
 I argue that, as precursors and allies of the resulting military campaign, 
cartographic and photographic representations of Waikato landscapes were 
weapons in the ‘literature of invasion’.20 In this article, I both endorse Gibbons’s 
contention that the ‘literature of invasion’ may be described as ‘the discursive 
explanation and legitimation of the central act of violence, the insertion of an 
alien people and polity into an already inhabited land’, and I also apply it to the 
colonization of the Waikato.21 In short, the textualization of the Waikato was 
a fundamental part of the larger process by which Europeans re-imagined and 
constructed the region. Gibbons claims that written texts were ‘a sharp instrument 
of colonization’. He suggests that ‘[w]riting and printing were crucial technologies 
in maintaining and extending the power of settler society over the indigenous 
inhabitants’.22 It is possible, then, that maps and photographs were even sharper 
instruments. Both have had a reputation for accuracy and objectivity that has 
masked their power to persuade and even warp meaning. Uncritical assumptions 
of scientific authority have potentially made them even more potent than other 
texts which might be read more cautiously. But neither maps nor photographs are 
simply benign images of objective reality. The discursive power of both mediums 
as tools of colonization has been illuminated by scholars such as Eleanor Hight 
and Gary Sampson, who argued that ‘photographs operate as complex discursive 
objects of colonial power and culture’,23 and J.B. Harley, who claimed that ‘[a]s 
much as guns and warships, maps have been the weapons of imperialism’.24
 Deconstructive interpretations of such images can also shed light on the 
cultural context of their production, as well as the overt and tacit intentions of 
their creators. Visual sources do not merely contain views but, more significantly, 
viewpoints. The language of positionality is full of visual metaphors, like ‘point of 
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view’, ‘perspective’ and ‘angle’, which serve to remind us of the power of images 
to construct, rather than simply reflect, reality. Europeans’ view of the world was 
filtered through a distinctive cultural lens which enabled them to make meaning of 
the unfamiliar. This ‘way of seeing’, or ‘gaze’, was not only a way of understanding 
the world, but also a means of claiming and controlling it. According to Geraldine 
Murphy, recognition of ‘the male/colonizing gaze is valuable because it insistently 
foregrounds the power relations of points of view’.25 The Europeans’ ‘colonizing 
gaze’ demanded and justified, in their minds, the appropriation and reconfiguration 
of indigenous space according to European priorities. The ‘scientific gaze’ claimed 
authority through assumptions of objectivity and empirical rigour. The authority 
of photographs and maps benefited, then, from their association with scientific 
methods and processes, and they were the products as well as the distributors of 
the European ‘gaze’.
 At the same time as these images were bringing Europe to the Waikato, they 
could also transport the Waikato to Europe. By depicting the region using common 
imagery, symbolism and idioms, images of exotic locations such as the Waikato 
could bring these places within an imperial frame of reference.26 For those who 
read these images within this same European cultural framework, the implicit and 
explicit meanings of their creators are likely to have been clear. Photographers and 
cartographers could translate the exotic for European consumption in terms that 
they could readily identify with. For Byrnes, these representations ‘made the new 
place … available for European scrutiny and speculation’.27 They could transcend 
space to allow ‘armchair travellers’ to experience a kind of vicarious participation 
in colonization as they ‘transformed the relationship of viewer to place from a 
physical experience to a mental exercise’.28 Particular constructions of space thus 
became normalized and universalized. Consumers of these images — whether 
actually in the Waikato or elsewhere in the empire — could share a common sense 
of place and identity. The ‘geographic imagination’ of people, who may in fact 
have been physically remote from each other, could therefore be connected.
 The four images analysed here have been selected because they demonstrate 
particular features which are common across a range of related contemporary 
examples. It is also important to note that this article is derived from a wider 
project in which a much greater number of images have been examined in order 
to provide a more comprehensive context in a way that is simply not possible 
here. For example, the picture above, ‘Scene near Whangamarino bridge’, is one 
of more than 140 images (negatives and prints) by Beere held at the Alexander 
Turnbull Library and available for viewing on the website portal Timeframes.29 Of 
these, approximately 40 are of Waikato subjects, over half of them dated between 
1863 and 1869.
 Although by 1866, when ‘Scene near Whangamarino Bridge’ was made, the 
military invasion was complete and the imposition of European political dominance 
over the region (at least as far south as the Puniu River) had been achieved, the 
landscape was proving more difficult, from a European point of view, to bring 
under control. What had already changed — and what this photograph exemplifies 
— was that it was now Europeans who claimed the right to make the decisions 
about the future direction and development of the region. Tangata whenua did not 
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simply abandon the field, but the military victory confirmed in European minds the 
inevitability of progress in a way they viewed as natural.
 Bearing in mind that the technological processes of constructing such pictures 
involved a time-consuming set up and a slow shutter speed, it is highly likely that 
such images were not spontaneous and casual, but carefully planned and arranged. 
The intentions of the photographer are, therefore, almost certainly explicit in the 
image itself. This was not an accidental or candid shot; it was a carefully and 
painstakingly composed tableau. By assembling the elements in this way, both the 
photographer and the subject have located themselves on the frontier of European 
expansion with an active role to play. Taming both ‘nature’ and ‘natives’ was an 
essential part of the colonizing process that led to the construction of European 
Waikato. Military and agricultural invasions played their parts in the displacement 
of indigenous people and landscapes and their replacement with European 
alternatives.
 Despite the fact that a Māori name has been given to the place represented in 
the image, it was not used in a way that takes account of its meaning(s) for the 
indigenous inhabitants of the region. ‘Whangamarino’ refers to a large area of 
wetland adjacent to the eastern bank of the Waikato River. The wetland is drained 
by a river, also called Whangamarino, which drains into the Waikato River near 
the point where the photograph was taken. Whangamarino can be rendered in 
English as ‘calm expanse of water’, but the words in translation provide a merely 
superficial gloss on the indigenous name.30 For Māori, Whangamarino was a 
large and fecund source of food such as eels and birds, and would therefore no 
doubt have had positive associations. From the European point of view, however, 
swamps like Whangamarino were impediments to progressive development. A 
contemporary commentator gave this rueful description of the Whangamarino 
‘creek’: ‘Were it not for the great number of stakes driven across it at intervals of 
about 300 yards by the natives, for the purpose of extending fishing nets, it would 
be a first-rate navigable river for such steamers as the “Avon”.’31 Re-imagined 
in this way, ‘Whangamarino’ was co-opted by the colonizers and shorn of its 
indigenous history and meaning. The place was not renamed so much as the name 
was re-placed. This act of appropriation allowed the newcomers to construct a 
local history which enabled them to identify as locals. Furthermore, this Waikato 
location also entered the lexicon of European imperialism. The Europeans 
controlled, or at least claimed jurisdiction over, the physical as well as discursive 
spaces, and photographs like this one proclaimed their successful incursion.
 The second photograph considered here, ‘Deviation on the road to Waikato, 
made by the Royal Artillery, through Williamson’s clearing’ (ca. 1863), is one of 
many such images that are directly associated with the British military invasion of 
the Waikato in the 1860s, quite literally placing it within the oeuvre of the ‘literature 
of invasion’.32 This image captures a stage in the construction of the Great South 
Road from Drury to Pokeno at some point during 1862 or 1863 and was taken by 
William Temple, an Assistant Surgeon in the Royal Artillery Regiment of the British 
Army who took a number of photographs associated with the preparation for, and 
execution of, the military invasion. Williamson’s Clearing, now the site of Bombay 
township, was the location of one of five redoubts on the road built to protect the 
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line of supply to the rear of Cameron’s troops as they prepared to advance south 
across the Mangatāwhiri Stream. The widening of the road and the clearing of bush 
from its edges was made necessary by the success of Kingite raiding parties which 
harassed and disrupted the British supply and reinforcement columns.33
 A number of other Temple images similarly record the progress of the 
road’s construction and improvement. Others depict encampments and related 
infrastructure, while others are of small groups, including some of Māori subjects. 
‘Action photography’ was, after all, still a genre for the future and photographers of 
Temple’s generation had to make the most of static scenes.34 Technical limitations 
imposed slow shutter speeds and therefore movement was blurred, to the point 
where human and other moving subjects were sometimes rendered completely 
invisible. The subjects of photographs, like these road-builders, were required to 
stop work in order to complete a successful photographic representation of their 
efforts. The bustle and strain of their activities have, of necessity, become static and 
far less dynamic than the reality of their situation. The location of the photographs, 
in well-lit clearings and open fields rather than within the closed and dark bush, 
may also have been mainly due to practical as opposed to aesthetic considerations.
Figure 2: William Temple, ‘Deviation on the road to Waikato, made by the Royal 
Artillery, through Williamson’s clearing’, ca 1863.
Source: Urquhart Album, PA1-q-250-48, ATL. 
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 Yet the location depicted here was on the margins of territory controlled by 
Europeans, and the clearings, roads and bridges had a symbolic importance for 
the colonists. The creation of farms from a primeval wilderness was driven by 
ideological as well as economic imperatives, and the construction of roads and 
bridges served a military purpose while also representing progress in a more 
general sense. The inscription below the image pointed out the ‘new bridge’ and 
the ‘dead rimu (red pine tree)’ so as to highlight the march of ‘civilization’ and the 
conquest of ‘savage’ nature. The location has been ‘captured’ and re-configured 
for European audiences by its framing and composition to claim control over and 
justify the appropriation of what, to them, was still ‘alien’ space. This image, and 
others like it, ‘confirmed the progress of Western civilization and proclaimed 
cultural, technological, industrial and military superiority’.35
 The intention of the photographer, with the co-operation of the subjects of the 
image, was clearly to record the activities of the soldier road-builders, as well 
as the progress of the object of their work. As such, it exemplifies a number of 
emerging discourses of photographic representation. The military photograph 
became an important genre of early photographic practice. Regiments like the 
Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery, Temple’s unit, were early adopters of 
the new technology.36 This was not yet ‘war photography’ as it was to become, 
owing to the fact that the technology was not suited to the dynamic action of the 
battlefield. Nevertheless, images of the Crimean War and the American Civil War, 
for example, became very well known during the period. Neatly arranged rows 
of British tents differed little whether in Sebastopol or Drury — yet in each of 
these locations, static army encampments were deemed worthy of photographic 
representation.37
 In the case of this image (and Temple’s photography more generally) the non-
battlefield activities of soldiers were recorded and used to demonstrate a positive 
side of military action. The horrors of war were absent from direct representation 
in these images. Viewers could vicariously take part in the victory in a way that 
was ‘safe, culturally sanitized and physically insulated’,38 without being subjected 
to actual (by being there) or even imaginary (by viewing a more graphic image) 
discomfort. The positive and progressive intent of the campaign, and more 
generally colonization itself, was in this way re-presented and re-communicated.
 Despite the positive intentions of the photographer and the possibility that 
these may have been plainly conveyed to a like-minded colonial and imperial 
audience, it is clear that the successful completion of the project depicted was 
still some way in the future. Some viewers may have focused their attention on 
the obstacles shown and the work as yet uncompleted. But, imperfect as it is, 
Temple’s image is a European construct privileging European endeavour in a way 
that made it clear to viewers that events were moving in the right direction. The 
title indicates that, although the physical location depicted in the image does not 
lie within any ‘official’ modern boundaries of Waikato, the Waikato is a subject of 
the photograph. ‘Road to Waikato’ indicated not only the destination of the troops 
but also the direction of colonial intention more generally.
 In a similar way, maps were also used as tools of invasion in both a literal and 
metaphorical sense. The Waikato became a place of military action after it was 
invaded by the British Army in 1863, and maps were used to directly promote this 
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process. But even prior to this event, the Waikato was already a contested location. 
Some years earlier, Europeans had begun to visualize the region in terms of its 
economic potential, as seen from their own cultural perspective. The control over 
the physical resources of the Waikato required the conquest of its spaces, and these 
were both imagined and predicted before physical and political authority was 
achieved. Maps provided powerful justification for the invasions, both military 
and cultural, of the Waikato.
Figure 3: ‘A map of the North Island of New Zealand shewing native and 
European territory’, 1861.
 Auckland City Libraries, NZ Map Number 2562.
 Charles Heaphy, chief surveyor (and later Victoria Cross awardee for his action 
at Waiari during the Waikato War), produced the map shown in figure 3 in March 
1861, just as the first Taranaki War was ending in stalemate with a truce signed at 
Te Arei on 19 March. The information recorded on this map, and its interpretation 
by Heaphy, served to provide a justification for the subsequent military invasion 
of the Waikato. This map clearly demarcated ‘Native and European territory’ in 
the North Island, quoting reference to ‘Official Maps of the Native Land Purchase 
Department and elsewhere’. Native territory is not coloured; European lands are 
shaded red. The red areas were predominantly located around and to the north of 
Auckland, Southern Hawke’s Bay and Wellington. A third category marked in 
green indicated ‘Districts that have fed the war’. Another important feature was the 
inclusion of figures indicating the ‘numbers of the Maoris [sic] in each locality’.39 
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Ignoring the actual differences in the involvement of Waikato tribes in the fighting 
in Taranaki, the whole region south of Ngāruawāhia was implicated by its green 
shading. The inference was that the green areas were preventing the extension of 
the regions marked in red. It is surely no coincidence that Heaphy chose the British 
Empire red to designate European lands.
 Heaphy used this map to illustrate an 1864 memorandum justifying the British 
invasion. He refuted the assertion that the wars had been caused by ‘apprehension 
on the part of the Natives of the white people dispossessing them of their lands, and 
by the existence of an actual pressure arising out of the spread of colonization’.40 
He concluded that, as no (or very little) land had been alienated within the ‘rebel’ 
territory, Māori in those districts could not have been ‘apprehensive’. Heaphy’s 
assertion reflected his view that Māori were the aggressors in the ‘Land Wars’, a 
perspective reinforced by government documents referring to the war as ‘Native 
insurrection’ or ‘rebellion’.41 Grey justified the military invasion of the Waikato on 
the pretext that he was pre-empting a planned Māori attack on Auckland. However, 
it is generally accepted now that Waikato Māori were fighting a defensive war 
in 1863–64 and that the British Army’s advance and attack had little to do with 
quelling a Māori uprising.42
 Heaphy’s map actually provides good support for Belich’s contention that the 
military invasion of the Waikato was designed to crush the Kīngitanga because 
it had become too prominent a symbol of ongoing Māori independence.43 As a 
result of the Treaty of Waitangi and subsequent gubernatorial declarations, all of 
New Zealand had become, in British eyes, part of the British Empire and subject 
to the sovereign authority of Britain. That this sovereignty was not able to be 
exercised in a substantive sense over Māori districts was a source of constant 
frustration for the early settler governments and the governors alike. Belich has 
suggested that this unwelcome state of affairs was tolerated in the 1840s and 
1850s for two reasons. Firstly, events like the Wairau incident and the Northern 
War showed the British that they lacked the military capability to impose their 
authority on Māori.44 The second factor encouraging British patience was the fact 
that the situation was gradually changing through land alienation. Land owned and 
occupied by Pākehā was effectively British territory, whereas Māori areas were, in 
practical terms, independent. While land sales were happening, the British ‘zone’ 
was expanding at the expense of the Māori ‘zone’. The Māori recognition of these 
implications was a key factor in the decision to create the Kīngitanga, as land 
placed under the mana of the King could be protected from alienation. To the 
British, this innovation made Māori independence look rather too prominent and 
permanent and therefore intolerable. 45
 Heaphy’s position as chief surveyor and his reference to ‘Official Maps’ 
give authority to the map. The precisely bordered areas shaded red (European 
lands) reinforce the reputation for scientific accuracy ascribed to cartographic 
measurement and representation. The fact that the European lands are so precisely 
defined and represented adds to the assertion of the advance of civilization. Native 
lands, including the ‘Districts that have fed the war’, are yet to be demarcated in this 
careful and explicit way. The border of the green area is hazy and indistinct, while 
the unshaded areas are represented as empty and undefined. Indigenous boundaries 
and ways of organizing and valuing land have been ignored or dismissed, further 
Simon Dench44
emphasizing the difference between ‘civilized’ European territory and Native 
‘savage’ lands. By contrasting these features, Heaphy has created a map which 
can be read as a sinister threat to Māori cultural and political independence.
 While the border of the green shaded area is not a hard line, it may have been 
assumed by contemporary map readers that the area within it had been equally 
objectively classified. This is clearly not the case. The green districts were not 
united in their attitude to the fighting in Taranaki when the map was dated — 
that is, July 1861. For example, while both Ngāti Haua and Ngāti Maniapoto had 
sent contingents to support Wīremu Kīngi at Waitara, to paint their respective 
leaders, Wīremu Tamihana and Rewi Maniapoto, the same shade is to trivialize 
the complex rivalry between these pillars of the Kīngitanga. Furthermore, Heaphy 
includes the King’s headquarters at Ngāruawāhia (not named but located at the 
confluence of the Waikato and Waipā rivers, at the northernmost point of the green 
shaded area) but not the King’s tribal lands to the north. To have done so would 
have brought the red of the settlement of Auckland and the green of the ‘rebels’ 
into much closer proximity. This would have undermined his assertion that the 
rebellious Māori had little cause to fear the direct encroachment of colonization 
and the resulting loss of land and independence.
 Heaphy tellingly equated land ownership and territory, implicitly identifying 
the mechanism by which Māori were losing their independence, a situation that 
resulted in the formation of the Kīngitanga in the first place. His appeal to ‘official’ 
sources and the ‘scientific’ nature of cartographic representation lent weight to his 
identification of the impediment to legitimate, in his eyes, extension of British 
control over the Waikato. He simultaneously conflated and underestimated the 
extent of opposition to these aims. But in so doing he mapped an enemy and 
provided a context for invasion.
 Figure 4: ‘Newcastle QUEENSTOWN (Ngaruawahia)’, 1864.
Source: Waikato University Map Library. Call Number: 530.1221 BH 1964, Description: 
Print Size 61 x 43 cm [24 x 17 inches]
 In July 1864, not long after the defeat of Bay of Plenty Kingite supporters at Te 
Ranga, the King’s capital, Ngāruawāhia, was offered for sale by the government. 
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Not only was this a hasty attempt to recoup some war expenses, it was also a 
blatant assertion of the British victory on the ground. The map, ‘Newcastle 
QUEENSTOWN (Ngaruawahia)’, labelled here as figure 4, is evidence that it was 
necessary to extend the discursive invasion of the Waikato even after the military 
victory was officially complete. The map depicts the survey of Ngāruawāhia 
(renamed Queenstown) and its division into 401 lots with a sale price of £100 
per acre.46 Potential buyers may have been tempted by the advantages of the new 
town’s location, nestled in the fork of the two major river arteries of the region. 
In addition, the Great South Road (150 feet wide) suggested a connection to the 
north to the capital, Auckland. This would have been a significant advantage for 
prospective settlers for both economic and security reasons at a time when the war 
was not yet concluded. The redoubt featured would have been reassuring for the 
same reason.
 The name initially given to the new settlement, ‘Queenstown’, can hardly 
have been more pointed in its message that the Māori King had been displaced 
by the British Queen. The question of the name provoked excited debate in the 
columns of the Daily Southern Cross in July and August 1864, in the course 
of which it was clear that one correspondent understood clearly that applying 
the name Queenstown asserted ‘the Queen ha[d] now possession of what was 
formerly the Maori King’s town’.47 The same writer also bemoaned the use of 
the name Cambridge: ‘Is it on the river Cam? or is it a seat of learning? or is 
it more euphonious than Pukerimu? No! decidedly not! to all three questions.’48 
This was countered by another correspondent who, referencing Greek, Roman 
Gothic, Celtic, Saxon and Norman precedents, claimed that ‘[a]s, then, Maori 
savage courage has had to succumb to British civilized valour, so let Ngaruawahia 
give place to Queenstown’.49 While each writer had markedly different views on 
the appropriate system for applying names within the newly conquered territory, 
neither considered the power to impose names to be in question. Even the ‘Lover 
of Maori Names’ did not invoke Maori perspectives on the background and 
meaning of Ngāruawāhia (or Pukerimu), even though he acknowledged that the 
replacement of Maori names by those of European origin would lead to, for Maori, 
a suspicion that ‘we wish to obliterate every evidence of the country having ever 
belonged to them or their fathers’. For others, this was precisely the point.
 The seeming haste with which the colonial government moved to promote 
the sale of land in the conquered territory was expedient for political as well as 
economic reasons. The speedy confiscation, survey and auction of lands such as 
those represented on this map, were justified by the imperative of recouping the 
considerable cost of waging war. Māori who had resisted the imposition of British 
control were obliged to relinquish the very resource which had hitherto enabled 
them to exercise political and economic independence. Land which was taken 
was then sold to Pākehā settlers with the effect — similar to the Irish experience 
some hundreds of years earlier — of promoting the occupation, pacification 
and civilization of the region. The Kīngitanga was deprived of its political and 
economic strength and government expenses were defrayed at the same time. This 
was not the first, or indeed the last, time that a system of ‘loser pays’ was used with 
considerable effect.
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 Ngāruawāhia had the dual advantages of its location at the confluence of the 
Waikato and Waipā rivers, and of being the former capital of the Māori King, 
now exiled to the ‘King Country’. The British victory over Kingite forces in the 
Waikato paved the way for the extension of roads and, in time, the railway into 
the region. In 1864, however, and for some considerable time after, the region’s 
rivers remained the principal transport routes, especially towards Auckland in the 
north. The Waipā was then equally as important as the larger Waikato. The port 
of Te Rore on the Waipā was the loading point for much of the produce destined 
for Auckland and beyond from the agricultural centre at Rangiaowhia during the 
1850s. The bar at the mouth of the river at Waikato Heads made access to the river 
by large vessels difficult, but having surmounted this obstacle, the river system 
was navigable as far south as Pukerimu (Cambridge) on the Waikato and Te Rore, 
for most of the year, on the Waipā.
 The original attempt to rename Ngāruawāhia was short-lived. ‘Queenstown’ 
was in turn displaced by ‘Newcastle’ in 1878. Newcastle was an emblematic name 
for two reasons. Firstly, it was the 5th Duke of Newcastle who, as Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, acquiesced to the original confiscation legislation. The 
other factor was the presence nearby of coal and the association of Newcastle in 
the United Kingdom with the coal industry. A common simile which suggests a 
pointless or unnecessary act is ‘like taking coals to Newcastle’. Perhaps those who 
proposed the name Newcastle for Ngāruawāhia were, as in Australia, responsible 
for turning this maxim on its head and bringing Newcastle to the coals.
 The imposition of the new name ‘Newcastle’ and its labelling on the map 
marked the beginning of the assertion of European control over the physical 
place and the discursive space of Ngāruawāhia. The survey on the ground and 
its representation on the map delineated this location according to European 
practice. A number of the shapes created by the interplay of roads and sections 
are reminiscent of the British Union Flag superimposed on the ground which 
reinforces a sense of the assertion of British sovereignty. The lots defined and 
displayed for sale laid claim not only to the ownership of the land but to the right 
to control how that land was imagined, valued and used. Indigenous perceptions 
of and associations with this whenua had been supplanted. In this regard, the 
spoils of war did not merely include the acquisition of Waikato soil, economic 
resources and communication links. Nor did the fruits of this invasion cease at 
the wresting of political control and the subsequent imposition of British law 
and government on a previously independent polity. On top of those extremely 
important consequences of the British invasion of the Waikato came the seizure of 
control of the cultural associations and practices, which allowed the Waikato to be 
defined in a European framework. One of the key functions of maps, such as that 
of ‘Newcastle Queenstown (Ngaruawahia)’ above, was to assert this annexation of 
the concept of place.
 Typical of cadastral maps in the European tradition, this map organized plots 
into geometric shapes. Ideally these were rectangles, although the regularity was 
broken by a sometimes uncooperative terrain. The geometrizing of the land went 
further than to deny Māori values of land use and organization. It also deliberately 
ignored topography and other geographical features like swamps, to render all 
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plots flat and equally accessible. The landscape itself was ‘civilized’ in this way. 
Inconvenient natural features were overcome by making them invisible. This 
practice had the disadvantage, though, of making such maps less accurate. Neat 
lines on the map did not necessarily equate to well-defined boundaries and other 
similar features on the ground; the orderliness of the representation contrasted 
with first-hand experience of the actual location. When first drawn, maps like 
this one were not depictions of what was really there, but were projections into 
the future. The intentions of the surveyors, cartographers and colonists were not 
always realized in straightforward and predictable ways, and sometimes they were 
not realized at all.
 Re-viewing the history of the invasion and colonization of the Waikato through 
a spatial history lens allows some light to be shed on the ways colonial power 
was expressed through means other than the well-known military invasion. 
A focus on war, conquest and confiscation has, to a large extent, obscured the 
importance of the discursive invasion which both preceded and outlived the 
military campaign. Waikato ‘space’ became transformed into ‘place’ in a European 
vernacular through a combination of discursive and ideological practices — 
including the use of photography and cartography to re-present local landscapes 
within a European conceptual framework. Not only was the land itself claimed 
for European ownership and control, but the power to define space, as well as 
to determine the value, use and the organization of land was appropriated by the 
invaders. The colonizing gaze of Europeans was supported, enacted and affirmed 
by photographic and cartographic technologies and practices as the Waikato was 
textualized using familiar tropes and strategies, while at the same time indigenous 
presence was ignored or even effaced altogether. As a result, widely dispersed 
people could share a common sense of place and identity as the Waikato was 
translated for colonial and imperial audiences. This identity was not ‘national’ 
in that it transcended any sense of New Zealand as a nation by connecting the 
Waikato directly with the British imperial world. The Waikato is not unique in 
this respect and the approach and method used here to investigate the colonization 
of the Waikato could as well be applied to other colonial contexts. Irrespective of 
whether, like the Waikato, these locations were prone to fog, the resulting re-view 
might be just as illuminating.
SIMON DENCH
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held at the Alexander Turnbull Library. Note the darkened upper corners. This is a common feature of 
the wet collodion process where a tacky, viscous solution was poured over the glass in order to create 
a light-sensitive plate. The photographer was obliged to hold the plate by its corners, which allowed 
for the even spread of the fluid across the surface of the glass, but prevented those areas covered 
by the photographer’s grip from being sensitized. These areas are rendered completely black in any 
subsequent positive print.
 2 The ‘Waikato’ can refer to a river, a region and/or a people. Each is difficult to define and the 
distinctions between them are, at times, arbitrary. In referring to ‘the Waikato’, I have generally 
emphasized the land and landscape. The river is referred to as ‘the Waikato River’.
 3 The term ‘weapon’ is used here metaphorically. While I am arguing that the ‘discursive invasion’ 
was, in the long term, as important as the military invasion, I am not suggesting that the effects of maps 
and photographs were as directly harmful to individuals as guns and bullets.
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1 (2002), p.15.
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New Zealand’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 14, 1 (1996), pp.99–122.
 20 The term is derived from Peter Gibbons’s chapter ‘Non-Fiction,’ in Terry Sturm, ed., The Oxford 
History of New Zealand Literature in English, Auckland, 1998. The larger project on which this article 
is based uses Gibbons’s breakdown of the phases of colonization – Exploration / Invasion / Occupation 
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